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NOTE
Missouri’s Hangover: Wine-ing about
Direct-to-Consumer Prohibition
Sarasota Wine Mkt., LLC v. Schmitt, 987 F.3d 1171 (8th Cir. 2021).
Matthew D. Warren*

I. INTRODUCTION
“[W]ine,” Thomas Jefferson once said, “[is] a necessary of life with
me.”1 The French Ambassador turned president spent well over $365,000
in today’s currency on imported wines during his eight-year tenure as
president of the United States.2 The intoxicating rights once afforded to
Jefferson, as a drafter of the Constitution, have shifted throughout history
with the passing of the Eighteenth and Twenty-First Amendments.3
Many view the repeal of prohibition as the end of the temperance
movement across the American political landscape, but this view ignores
the continuing importance of Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment
(“Section 2”).4 Section 2 states that “[t]he transportation or importation
into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or
use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof is hereby
prohibited.”5 Multiple states, including Missouri, passed stringent Liquor
Control Acts as a “comprehensive scheme for regulation and control of the
manufacture, sale, possession, transportation, and distribution of
*

B.S., Butler University, 2019; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law,
2023; Associate Editor-in-Chief, Missouri Law Review, 2022–2023; Associate
Member, Missouri Law Review, 2021–2022. I am grateful for my advisor Erika
Lietzan, William H. Pittman Professor of Law & Timothy J. Heinsz Professor of Law,
for her insight, guidance, and support during the writing of this Note as well as the
Missouri Law Review staff for their dedication and thoughtfulness during the editing
process. This Note is dedicated to my role models, my parents, and my older brother,
for their continued love and support.
1
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Appleton (Jan. 14, 1816), 9 The
Papers of Thomas Jefferson 349, 351 (J. Jefferson Looney ed., 2012).
2
See JOHN HAILMAN, THOMAS JEFFERSON ON WINE 256 (2006).
3
See U.S. CONST. amends. XVIII (repealed 1933), XXI.
4
Marcia Yablon, The Prohibition Hangover: Why We Are Still Feeling the
Effects of Prohibition, 13 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 552, 552 (2006).
5
U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
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intoxicating liquor.”6 Although there are no completely dry states, some
states severely limit liquor sales and distribution.7 For example, only the
State government may import alcohol in Utah, making it the leading
retailer of all alcoholic products other than light beer.8 Similarly, in
Michigan, the State is the only permitted wholesaler for liquor, but not
wine and beer.9
In 2007, Missouri amended its Liquor Control Act to allow in-state
and out-of-state wine producers to ship wine directly to Missouri
consumers.10 This amendment, however, requires wine retailers to have a
physical presence within Missouri and a retail license to ship wine directly
to consumers.11 A wine retailer in Sarasota, Florida, recently challenged
the validity of the Missouri amendment on Dormant Commerce Clause
grounds. 12 In Sarasota Wine Market, LLC v. Schmitt, the Eighth Circuit
faced two important, yet competing interests: (1) Missouri’s power under
the Twenty-First Amendment, which allows states to regulate the
transportation or importation of alcohol within its economic system; and
(2) the freedoms of retailers like Sarasota Wine Market to ship and sell
alcohol within an interstate system of commerce. 13
The year 2020 would likely have restricted a founding father from
enjoying his favorite glass of French wine or, as he might say, his “Life,
Liberty, and pursuit of Happiness” in Missouri.14 The Eighth Circuit’s
interpretation of current legal doctrines surrounding alcohol distribution
similarly inhibits the alcohol industry’s growth during a pandemic and ecommerce driven world—bringing to light a new kind of prohibition. Part
II of this Note describes the prohibitionary history in the United States, the
three-tier alcohol distribution system in Missouri, and the facts in
Sarasota. Part III provides the relevant legal background of the Dormant
Commerce Clause and the Twenty-First Amendment. Part IV explains the
Eighth Circuit’s decision in Sarasota, which held that Missouri’s retail
licensing residency requirement is constitutional, as it does not
discriminate against out-of-state retailers and is necessary to protect the
health and safety of Missouri citizens. Finally, Part V argues that the
Supreme Court of the United States needs to reevaluate the
constitutionality of the three-tier system under its new Tennessee Wine

6
John Bardenheir Wine & Liquor Co. v. City of St. Louis, 135 S.W.2d 345, 346
(Mo. 1939) (en banc).
7
Sarasota Wine Mkt., LLC v. Schmitt, 987 F.3d 1171, 1176 (8th Cir. 2021).
8
See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 32B-2-202, -204, -501, 32B-7-202 (2019).
9
See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 436.1231 (1998).
10
See MO. REV. STAT. § 311.185 (2007).
11
Id.
12
Sarasota, 987 F.3d at 1177.
13
See id. at 1179–80.
14
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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test, which addresses the relationship between the Dormant Commerce
Clause and Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment within the growing
world of e-commerce. 15

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
To understand the facts of Sarasota, it is necessary to first explain the
three-tier alcohol distribution system and prohibitionary history in the United
States.

A. An Old Fashion: The Traditional Three-tier Model of Alcohol
Distribution
Throughout the twentieth century, many states enacted laws
composed of a “three-tier model” for alcohol distribution.16 Under the
original three-tier system, there are three distinct and independentlyowned levels of distribution through which alcohol must travel before
being sold to consumers..17 First, the producer – often a winery, brewer,
or distiller – sells its product to a licensed in-state wholesaler.18 Second,
the wholesaler – typically the most essential and restrictive level of the
three-tier system – pays the excise taxes and delivers the alcohol to the instate retailers.19 Generally few in number and sometimes state-owned,
wholesalers are the pathway through which all alcohol travels when
entering a state’s commerce system.20 States often use the wholesaler-tier
to control alcohol sales through inflated or competitive pricing, taxation,
and other regulations.21 In the final step, after the producer’s shipment and
wholesaler’s regulations, the retailer sells the alcoholic products directly
to the consumer while collecting the applicable taxes.22 The consumer is

15

See Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2459

(2019).
16

Sarasota, 987 F.3d at 1176.
Id.
18
Id.; Throughout this Note, singular “they” is used to respect and acknowledge
nonbinary individuals; the author believes that “they” should be the default singular
pronoun for an individual of unknown gender, rather than utilizing “he or she.” See
Singular ‘They', MERRIAM–WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-atplay/singular-nonbinary-they [https://perma.cc/KET9-ERSL] (last visited Jan. 2,
2022).
19
Sarasota, 987 F.3d at 1176; Lebamoff Enters. v. Whitmer, 956 F.3d 863, 868
(6th Cir. 2020).
20
Lebamoff, 956 F.3d at 868.
21
In Missouri, the State prohibits wholesalers from offering volume discounts
to retailers. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 311.322 (2009); Lebamoff, 956 F.3d at 868.
22
Sarasota, 987 F.3d at 1176.
17
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then free to “cheers” and drink within the bounds of the state’s statutory
laws.
In the nineteenth century, the Missouri legislature passed the original
three-tier model to prevent a return to the “tied-house system,” which
facilitated monopolies throughout the alcohol distribution process from
the producer down to the consumer.23 Historically, tied-house systems and
alcohol monopolies in the United States were run by “absentee owners”
who were part of the producer tier.24 The absentee owners provided
potential saloonkeepers with property, equipment, and supplies to start
their own saloons in exchange for exclusive alcohol distribution
contracts.25 As a result, the absentee owners never witnessed the local
damage produced by the liquor distributed within their respective
communities.26 Instead, the absentee owners were solely focused on
turning a profit.27
In early American history, those states without a protective three-tier
system often struggled with excess alcohol consumption among children
and adults, leading to unstable households and greater levels of misery,
addiction, and crime.28 Because each tier of the three-tier system is
independently owned and operated, no member of one tier will have a
financial interest in a higher or lower tier.29 Thus, the original three-tier
system effectively helped eliminate tied-house systems and alcohol
monopolies within Missouri and minimized the dangerous effects of
alcohol within a community.30
In 1919, Congress quashed the need for the three-tier system when it
ratified the Eighteenth Amendment after citizens lobbied to ban alcohol
manufacture, sale, and transportation.31 That nationwide experiment came
to a halt in 1933 when the ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment

23
See id. at 1175–76. A study by the FTC found that this system raises costs,
reduces selection, and burdens the overall market. FED. TRADE COMM’N, POSSIBLE
ANTICOMPETITIVE BARRIERS TO E-COMMERCE: WINE at 3–4 (2003),
https://www.ftc.gov/reports/possible-anticompetitive-barriers-e-commerce-wine
[https://perma.cc/4S9W-JTS3].
24
See Lebamoff, 956 F.3d at 867.
25
The “absentee owners” of the producer tier were often focused on the
economics of the alcohol industry, forcing heavy sales and ease of access to
alcohol. See id. This blind ownership ignored the social impacts of increased alcohol
sales within various communities nationwide. Id.
26
Lebamoff, 956 F.3d at 867.
27
See id.
28
Id.; Sarasota, 987 F.3d at 1176.
29
Sarasota, 987 F.3d at 1176.
30
Id.
31
See id. at 1175; Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct.
2449, 2467 (2019); Lebamoff, 956 F.3d at 867–68; U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII
(repealed 1933).
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ended alcohol prohibition.32 Section 1 of the Twenty-First Amendment
repealed the Eighteenth Amendment, while Section 2 provided that “the
transportation or importation into any state . . . for the delivery or use
therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby
prohibited.”33 As the Supreme Court once wrote, Section 2 essentially
grants “complete control to the states to permit the importation or sale of
liquor and [decide] how to structure [their own] liquor system.”34 As such,
Section 2 effectively gave states three avenues: prohibit the sale of alcohol
within its borders, permit the sale of alcohol in a market heavily regulated
by the state’s visible hand, or permit the sale of alcohol with little to no
regulation.35 In response to ratification, Missouri promptly enacted the
Liquor Control Act in 1933, reviving its pre-prohibition three-tier
system.36

B. The King of Beers: Missouri’s Liquor Control Act and License
Provisions
In Missouri, not every drop of alcohol goes through the three-tier
system. For example, Missouri allows out-of-state wineries to ship wine
directly to consumers.37 Allowing producers to ship directly to consumers
is unlike allowing retailers to do so. The former is an exception to the
general rule that all alcohol must pass through licensed wholesalers and
retailers before arriving to consumers.38 Typically, licensed retailers ship
alcohol purchased from licensed wholesalers, causing both transactions to
occur wholly within a state’s three-tier distribution system.39
32

Sarasota, 987 F.3d at 1175.
Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 2) (emphasis added).
34
Sarasota Wine Mkt., LLC v. Parson, 381 F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1097 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2019) (quoting Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445
U.S. 97, 110 (1980)).
35
Lebamoff, 956 F.3d at 868.
36
MO. REV. STAT. Ch. 311; Sarasota, 987 F.3d at 1175–76.
37
See MO. REV. STAT. § 311.185.1 (2007). In 2007, in response to the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Granholm v. Heald, the Missouri legislature amended the Liquor
Control Act allowing in-state and out-of-state wine producers and retailers to ship
wine directly to Missouri consumers. Sarasota, 987 F.3d at 1176. However, this
statutory provision was repealed in 2017, limiting direct-to-consumer shipment of
wine and other alcoholic beverages to those exclusively holding an in-state retailer
license or direct from wineries as producers. See id. This simultaneously removed outof-state retailers from their ability to ship directly to in-state consumers. See id. at
1177.
38
Sarasota, 987 F.3d at 1176; MO. REV. STAT. §§ 311.465, 311.300.2,
311.240.3.
39
Sarasota, 987 F.3d at 1176. The State of Missouri also argues that another
distinction of Missouri’s alcohol regime is that it is consistently rated “one of the least
restrictive in the United States.” WILLIAM P. RUGER & JASON SORENS, FREEDOM IN
33
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Unique to Missouri’s traditional three-tier system is a ban preventing
the sale of alcohol “without taking a license.”40 To obtain a license, an
applicant must demonstrate “good moral character” and establish that they
are “a qualified legal voter and taxpaying citizen of the county, town, city
or village” in which the act of alcohol distribution will occur.41 A
corporate licensee’s managing officer must also abide by Missouri
licensing rules and operate from the physical premises in Missouri listed
in the license.42 Finally, the managing retailer and officer must purchase
liquor exclusively from Missouri-licensed wholesalers.43

C. Brewing a New Debate: Sarasota Wine Market, LLC v. Schmitt
Sarasota involved two sets of plaintiffs: Missouri residents seeking
to buy wines from out-of-state retailers and an out-of-state retailer
(“Magnum Wine”) wanting to ship wines directly to Missouri residents.44
If the Missouri Liquor Control Act – which requires physical residency in
Missouri for retailers – were ruled unconstitutional under the Dormant
Commerce Clause,45 these residents could purchase wine from the out-ofstate retailer and the out-of-state retailer could sell and ship the wine
directly to the Missouri residents.46
Magnum Wine did not intend to establish Missouri residency or
restrict its purchases to Missouri-licensed wholesalers.47 Although these

THE 50 STATES

159 (3d ed. 2013). In fact, since 2000, Missouri has ranked either first
or second in terms of “alcohol freedom,” a category that includes the distribution
regulations challenged in this case. Missouri Alcohol Freedom, FREEDOM IN THE 50
STATES, https://www.freedominthe50states.org/alcohol/missouri [https://perma.cc/
J5B5-EUDY] (last visited Apr. 25, 2022).
40
See MO. REV. STAT. § 311.180.1 (2007). Missouri also licenses “solicitors”
who can act as intermediaries between producers and wholesalers. See id. § 311.180.2.
Although solicitors may be considered a “fourth tier,” their inclusion “does not alter
the basic features of the three-tier system” that the Supreme Court has endorsed,
including in-state presence requirements. S. Wine & Spirits of Am. v. Div. of Alcohol
& Tobacco Control, 731 F.3d 799, 805 n.3 (8th Cir. 2013); Sarasota Wine Mkt., LLC
v. Parson, 381 F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1097 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019); MO. REV. STAT. §
311.050.
41
MO. REV. STAT. § 311.060.1 (2021).
42
Id. § 311.280.1 (2009).
43
Id. §§ 311.220.3 (2016), 311.240.3 (2007).
44
Sarasota, 381 F. Supp. 3d at 1094.
45
“The Congress shall have the power to... regulate Commerce ... among the
several states.” U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Although phrased as an affirmative grant
of power to Congress, the Supreme Court has long held that this Clause also prohibits
state laws that unduly restrict interstate commerce. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers
Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2459 (2019).
46
Sarasota, 381 F. Supp. 3d at 1097–98.
47
Sarasota Wine Mkt., LLC v. Schmitt, 987 F.3d 1171, 1177 (8th Cir. 2021).
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procedures would permit Magnum Wine to qualify for an in-state retail
license and allow direct-to-consumer shipments to Missouri residents,
they would also impose unreasonable economic stress on Magnum Wine’s
business that similarly situated Missouri-based retailers do not
encounter.48 The plaintiffs (together, “Sarasota”) sued the defendants,
Missouri Governor Mike Parson and Attorney General Eric Schmitt
(“Missouri Officials”) in their official capacities.49
Sarasota alleged that, as applied to retailers shipping wine directly to
Missouri consumers, the residency and physical presence license
requirements violate the Dormant Commerce Clause because they
discriminate against interstate commerce and constitute economic
protectionism of local businesses.50 By contrast, Missouri Officials argued
that the licensing requirements are permissible components of the threetier system that the United States Supreme Court has deemed
“unquestionably legitimate” under Section 2 of the Twenty-First
Amendment.51 While the Eighth Circuit previously stated that only
producers are protected from state restrictions fashioned under Section 2,52
here the district court held that Magnum Wine is a retailer and therefore
subject to state restrictions under Section 2.53
Sarasota appealed, relying on the Supreme Court’s recent
interpretation of Section 2 in Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers
Association v. Thomas,54 where the Court rejected the Eighth Circuit’s
original approach.55 Noting that Missouri imposes the same licensing

48

Sarasota, 381 F. Supp. 3d at 1098.
Id.
50
Sarasota, 987 F.3d 1171, 1177.
51
It is important to note that this is mentioned in the concurrence as dicta. Id. at
1177, 1180 (8th Cir. 2021) (citing North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 447
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
52
Sarasota, 987 F.3d at 1177 (emphasis added) (citing S. Wine & Spirits of
Am., Inc. v. Div. of Alcohol and Tobacco Control, 731 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 2013)).
53
Id. (emphasis added).
54
Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (2019).
55
Tennessee Wine, which explicitly rejected the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning in
Southern Wine, was decided after the holding in Sarasota. See generally id. The
Eighth Circuit, however, heavily relied on Southern Wine in its reasoning and decision
in Sarasota. Sarasota, 987 F.3d at 1177. This now preempted reliance led to seemingly
inconsistent holdings within the law of alcohol distribution within Missouri. Attorney
General (now Senator) Joshua Hawley, whom current Attorney General Eric Schmitt
later replaced, specifically requested that the United States District Court of the
Eastern District of Missouri not wait for the Supreme Court’s decision in Tennessee
Wine to be announced. Hawley claimed that Tennessee Wine was not directly related
to the issues of Sarasota and, therefore, should be decided before a new precedent is
released. Defs. Resp. to Pls. Notice of Action by U.S. Supreme Ct., Sarasota Wine
Mkt., LLC v. Parsons, No. 4:17-cv-2792 HEA (Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2019);
Sarasota, 987 F.3d at 1177.
49

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2022

7

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 3 [2022], Art. 18

960

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

requirements on in-state and out-of-state retailers, the Eighth Circuit in
Sarasota Wine Market ultimately affirmed the district court’s decision and
held that the licensing requirements are constitutional under the Dormant
Commerce Clause.56

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Commerce Clause and Twenty-First Amendment together
provide a legal framework for policing alcohol manufacturing,
consumption, and distribution within the United States.57 The history of
American alcohol laws can be separated into three main categories: (1) the
pre-prohibition period, from the Wilson Act of 1890 to the ratification of
the Eighteenth Amendment in 1919;58 (2) the post-prohibition period,
from the adoption of the Twenty-First Amendment in 1933 to the Court’s
narrow approach to state power in the 1980s;59 and (3) the modern legal
doctrine used to analyze restrictions on alcohol distribution. Circuit courts
are currently split in their approach to these issues, and the United States
Supreme Court attempted to resolve this tension in Tennessee Wine.

A. Sweet to Dry Regulations: Pre-Prohibition and the Dormant
Commerce Clause
The regulation of interstate alcohol began well before the ratification
of the Eighteenth Amendment, as the Supreme Court struck down state
laws banning or burdening the sale of imported liquor in a series of cases
in the 1880s.60 These cases advanced the Dormant Commerce Clause
theory that Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution
prevented states from discriminating against imported liquor and passing
facially neutral laws that placed an impermissible burden on interstate
commerce.61 For example, in Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co.,

56

Sarasota, 987 F.3d at 1184–85.
Amdt 21.1 Twenty-First Amendment: Doctrine and Practice,
CONGRESS.GOV,
https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt211/ALDE_00001007/ [https://perma.cc/QZN7-5FU4].
58
See generally Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005).
59
Id.
60
See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 476 (citing multiple cases).
61
See Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412 (1898); Vance v. W.A. Vandercook Co.,
170 U.S. 438 (1898); Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58 (1897); Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S.
100 (1890) (allowing for any liquor in its original package to be immune from any
state regulation); Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co., 125 U.S. 465 (1888)
(striking down an Iowa statute that required all liquor importers to have a permit)
(Iowa responded by banning the sale of all imported liquor); Walling v. Michigan, 116
U.S. 446, 445 (1886) (invalidating a Michigan tax that discriminated against liquor
imported from other states while exempting the sale of local products as an
57
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the Court struck down an Iowa statute that prohibited the transportation of
alcohol within the limits of the State unless accompanied with a specific
license.62 The Court reasoned that the Iowa law was repugnant to the
Dormant Commerce Clause because alcohol shipments from Illinois to
Iowa directly affect interstate commerce—which Congress has the
exclusive right to control under Article I, Section 8, Clause 3.63
Two years later, in Leisy v. Hardin, the Court again faced a
constitutional challenge to an Iowa statute—this time one that prohibited
the sale of alcohol except by local pharmacists for medicinal, chemical, or
religious purposes.64 While the Leisy Court expressly acknowledged the
rights of states to pass legislation to protect their citizens from the harmful
effects of alcohol, its decision seemed to rely on Bowman and was based
more on whether states could usurp powers explicitly reserved for
Congress.65 The Leisy Court held that, in the absence of Congress’s
permission, the Iowa legislature violated the Dormant Commerce Clause
because it had no authority to pass statutes which interfered with the
interstate importation of alcohol.66
In response to Leisy, Congress passed the Wilson Act in 1890,67
which empowered states to regulate interstate liquor on the same terms as
intrastate alcohol so long as they did not discriminate against out-of-state
liquor. 68 Congress also passed the Webb-Kenyon Act in 1913, which
prohibited the shipment or transportation of alcohol only where it ran afoul
of the state’s generally applicable laws governing receipt, possession, sale,
or use.69 These acts allowed a state to declare itself dry, provided that the
state treated in-state and out-of-state liquor equally by banning the
shipment and sale of both.70 The success of these acts fueled the
temperance movement’s call for an amendment for total prohibition at the
federal level.71 The regulatory scheme between state powers granted
under the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts and federal regulatory powers
inherent in the Dormant Commerce Clause halted with the ratification of

“usurpation of power conferred by the constitution to Congress.”); Tiernan v. Rinker,
102 U.S. 123 (1880).
62
Rhodes, 170 U.S. at 415.
63
Id.
64
Leisy, 135 U.S. at 122.
65
Id. at 111.
66
Id. at 125–25.
67
See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 478 (2005).
68
27 U.S.C. § 121.
69
Id. § 122.
70
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 481.
71
Kendall Dicke, Wait or Discriminate? Implications of Tennessee Wine &
Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas on the Alcohol Market, 81 LA. L. REV. 581, 595
(2021).
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the Eighteenth Amendment, which called for the total prohibition
manufacture, sale, or transportation of alcohol within the United States.72

B. On the Rocks to Neat: The Twenty-First Amendment in the
Twentieth Century
The ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment in 1933 brought an
end to prohibition’s thirteen-year failed experiment.73 Section 1 of the
Twenty-First Amendment directly repealed the Eighteenth Amendment,
while “[t]he wording of Section 2 closely follow[ed] the Webb-Kenyon
and Wilson Acts, expressing the clear intention of constitutionalizing the
Dormant Commerce Clause framework established throughout those
[historical] statutes.”74 However, the legislative intent of Section 2,
including the effective adoption of the Dormant Commerce Clause’s
wording and reasoning, was quickly lost by the judiciary.75 The early
courts misinterpreted Section 2 as transferring interstate commerce power
from Congress to the states by constitutional amendment.76 This
interpretation led to absolute state control over interstate commerce
affecting intoxicating liquors and rendered the Dormant Commerce Clause
immaterial to liquor regulations.77
The Supreme Court further solidified this broad overreach of state
powers under Section 2 in a series of cases where states took it upon
themselves to expand their trade barriers.78 The seminal case providing an
initial judicial review of Section 2 was California Board of Equalization

U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII; Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 571 F.3d 185, 194
(2d Cir. 2009) (Calabresi, Circuit Judge, concurring).
73
U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
74
Section 2 states, “the transportation or importation into any State . . . for
delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is
prohibited.” (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 205–06 (1976).
75
See Arnold’s Wines, Inc., at 195. (Calabresi, Circuit Judge, concurring) (“The
language of section two is rather opaque. In its terms, it does not authorize any state
regulation but rather just forbids people from transporting alcohol into a state in ways
that violate that state's laws. Courts, nevertheless, have consistently (and
understandably) read the section to authorize broad state regulation.”).
76
See id.
77
Id.
78
See Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401 (1938); Indianapolis
Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm’n, 305 U.S. 391 (1939) (holding that the
Dormant Commerce Clause does not limit the right of a state to regulate the
importation of liquor even when faced with a discriminating reciprocity
statute); Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939) (holding states possessed full
policing authority over the exportation of alcohol across state lines); Joseph S. Finch
& Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395 (1939); State Bd. Of Equalization of Cal. v.
Young’s Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59 (1936).
72

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol87/iss3/18

10

Warren: Missouri’s Hangover: Wine-ing about Direct-to-Consumer Prohibitio

2022]

DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER PROHIBITION

963

v. Young’s Market Co.79 In Young’s Market, the Court acknowledged that
a California statute, which imposed a license fee for importing beer within
its borders, would have violated the Dormant Commerce Clause before
Section 2’s enactment.80 But the Court argued that Section 2 narrowed the
scope of the Dormant Commerce Clause as it relates to alcohol distribution
and therefore held that the California statute was constitutional.81 This
laissez-faire approach to state statutes regarding alcohol shifted after the
implementation of FDR’s “New Deal” amid the Great Depression.
In 1945, the Court laid a new foundation to reincorporate the
Dormant Commerce Clause’s influence into alcohol regulation.82 In
United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, for example, wholesalers, retailers,
and producers in Colorado conspired to artificially inflate the prices of outof-state-imported liquor.83 The Court held that while Section 2 gives states
power over the importation of alcohol, it does not remove the federal
government’s ability to regulate interstate commerce of liquor outside the
respective state.84 The Court reasoned that even if Section 2 grants states
broad regulatory power over liquor traffic within their boundaries, both
the Sherman Act and Colorado Fair Trade Act prohibited this type of price
inflation under the Dormant Commerce Clause.85 The “rewriting” of the
judicial interpretation of Section 2 and the Dormant Commerce Clause
continued until 1964 when the Court further clarified the relationship in
Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp.86 In Hostetter, the Court
mentioned that Section 2 did not repeal the Dormant Commerce Clause
when liquor is involved, but instead, the two constitutional provisions
must be considered in light of the other and within the context of the issues
at stake.87
The Court continued to narrow its reading of Section 2’s state
protections throughout the 1980s.88 First, in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias,
the Court noted that economic protectionism was not “the central purpose”
79

See State Bd., 299 U.S. at 59.
Id. at 60–62.
81
See id. at 63–64.
82
See United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293 (1945).
83
Id. at 295.
84
Id. at 299.
85
Id.
86
See Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
87
Id. at 331–32; See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 206 (1976) (reaffirming
its point in Hostetter that the Dormant Commerce Clause must be considered with
Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment when considering regulation of intoxicating
liquors); cf. Dep’t. of Revenue v. James Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S. 341 (1964);
Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518 (1938).
88
See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 343 (1989); Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 585 (1986); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v.
Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984).
80
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of Section 2.89 Instead, the Court provided that state laws enacted for the
sole purpose of protectionism are not entitled to the same deference as
state laws that use Section 2 to support temperance and protect the health
and safety of a state’s citizens.90 In an effort to prevent states from relying
on Section 2 to control economic competition, the Bacchus Court
ultimately struck down a Hawaiian tax exemption favoring locallyproduced alcohol.91 In two subsequent cases, the Court continued to strike
down protectionist state statutes—ones which required liquor producers to
affirm they were not charging higher prices to citizens in different states.92
The Court reasoned that Section 2 does not permit states to regulate sales
prices in other states because the Dormant Commerce Clause grants that
power to Congress.93
In addition to a narrower reading of Section 2’s protections for states,
the Court noted in North Dakota v. United States that Section 2 directly
supports the three-tier system.94 In North Dakota, the State enacted a
statute requiring that all liquor sold within its borders be purchased
through a licensed in-state wholesaler.95 The Court held that states could
assume direct control of liquor distribution through state-run outlets or
funnel sales through a wholesaler within a traditional three-tier system.96
In dictum, the Court even recognized that the three-tier system itself is
“unquestionably legitimate.”97

C. Shaken or Stirred: The Implementation of North Dakota Ultimatum
and the Granholm Test
Before North Dakota, the three-tier system remained largely
untouched by judiciary challenges throughout the twentieth century. In
1994, however, the Fifth Circuit examined a Dormant Commerce Clause
challenge to a Texas law which required a three-year residency to receive
a retail liquor license in the state.98 The case also examined a related Texas
statute which required all corporations with a liquor-license to be owned
in a majority by license-eligible individuals—whom are those that meet
89

Bacchus Imports, Ltd., 468 U.S. at 276.
Id.
91
Id.
92
See Healy, 491 at 343 (invalidating a Connecticut price affirmation statute that
requires producers to limit the price of liquor based on the lowest price they offered
out of State); See also Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 475 U.S. at 585 (invalidating
a similar New York price affirmation statute).
93
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 475 U.S. at 585.
94
See North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423 (1990) (plurality opinion).
95
Id. at 428.
96
Id. at 432.
97
Id.; see id. at 447 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
98
See Cooper v. McBeath, 11 F.3d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1994).
90
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the residency requirements.99 The Fifth Circuit relied on the Supreme
Court’s more modern Section 2 doctrine to establish that the burden of
proof shifts to states when a statute gives rise to the tension between
Section 2 and the Dormant Commerce Clause. According to the Fifth
Circuit, the Supreme Court’s Section 2 precedent requires that such states
show a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by
reasonable, nondiscriminatory alternatives.100 The standards for such a
task are towering and invoke the strictest scrutiny as economic
protectionism affected by state legislation is prima facie invalid.101 Texas
officials provided sufficient evidence of the statute’s local benefits but
failed to prove the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives.102
Thus, the Fifth Circuit struck down Texas’s protectionist residency
requirement for liquor retailers as unconstitutional and not within the
powers reserved by Section 2.103
The Sixth Circuit took up a similar challenge in Granholm v. Heald—
a case that would permanently sever the producer level from the rest of the
three-tier model.104 In Granholm, New York and Michigan had traditional
three-tier systems to regulate alcohol transportation and distribution which
permitted the direct-to-consumer shipment of wine from in-state wine
producers.105 They did not afford out-of-state wine producers the same
privilege.106 In other words, in-state wineries could bypass the middleman
(i.e., wholesalers) in the three-tier system, but their out-of-state
competitors could not.107 However, New York provided a statutory
scheme that permitted an out-of-state winery to bypass the wholesaler and
ship direct-to-consumer if it: (1) used seventy-five percent New York
grapes and (2) established a physical presence, such as a “branch, office
or storeroom,” within the State lines.108 These requirements were
99
In this case, the owners needed to require Texas’ three-year prior residency
requirement to receive and hold a valid liquor license within the State. Id.
100
See North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 432; Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 343
(1989); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 585
(1986); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984).
101
Cooper, 11 F.3d at 553; Cf., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979)
(“[F]acial discrimination by itself may be a fatal defect” and “[a]t a minimum …
invokes the strictest scrutiny”); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624
(1978) (“Where simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a
virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected.”).
102
Cooper, 11 F.3d at 554.
103
Id. at 555. (quoting Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crips, 467 U.S. 691, 714
(1984)).
104
See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 468 (2005).
105
Id. at 466.
106
Id. at 466–67.
107
Id.
108
N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW §§ 3(20-a), 3(37); Granholm, 544 U.S. at 470
(quoting N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 3(37)).
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prohibitory in nature and created a slippery slope for state protectionism
under Section 2, as expanding its protections to allow every state to impose
similar residency requirements would be unreasonable.109 Granholm
made its way to the Supreme Court, where the majority mentioned that the
courts have continually “viewed with particular suspicion state statutes
requiring business operations to be performed in the home state that could
be more efficiently performed elsewhere.”110
In 2005, the Granholm Court held that the New York and Michigan
statutes were unconstitutional as straightforward attempts to discriminate
in favor of in-state wine producers.111 The Court reasoned that the states
provided little evidence that they could not police out-of-state shipments
as efficiently as those shipped from in-state wineries.112 Granholm
effectively severed the producer level from the three-tier system because
it upheld the direct shipment of wine from producer to consumer—so long
as this privilege is afforded to both in-state and out-of-state wine
producers.113
The Granholm Court also reanalyzed the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon
Acts, which did not provide for immunization of all alcohol regulations
from Dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny, but protected only those laws
which treat in-state liquor the same as its out-of-state equivalent.114 This
analysis produced the Granholm test, now used to determine the
constitutionality of state liquor regulations115 The Granholm test provides
that courts shall not uphold a state alcohol statute which discriminates in
favor of in-state producers or products unless the statute reasonably
advances legitimate state interests that reasonable, nondiscriminatory
alternatives cannot adequately serve.116 This new framework opened the
gates for a flood of new litigation regarding the constitutionality of state
restrictions on the wholesaler and retailer tiers.

D. Seltzers or Beer: The Modern Debate Outside the Producer Tier
The Eighth Circuit was the first to explore tensions between the
Twenty-First Amendment and the Dormant Commerce Clause regarding
state licensing of wholesalers.117 In Southern Wine & Spirits of America

109

Granholm, 544 U.S. at 475.
Id. (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970)).
111
Id. at 493.
112
Id. at 492–93.
113
Id. at 493 (emphasis added).
114
Id. at 462.
115
Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 571 F.3d 185, 189 (2d Cir. 2009).
116
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489.
117
See S. Wine & Spirits of Am., Inc. v. Div. of Alcohol and Tobacco Control,
731 F.3d 799, 809 (8th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added).
110
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v. Division of Alcohol and Tobacco, the Eighth Circuit examined a
Missouri statute that imposed a three-year durational residency
requirement on alcohol wholesalers and wholesaler officials and
directors.118 Southern Wine challenged the statute on Dormant Commerce
Clause grounds because it had officers located in Florida and could not
qualify for a Missouri wholesaler license.119
The Eighth Circuit used a modified Granholm test that considered the
reasoning found in the Supreme Court’s North Dakota analysis.120 The
court first determined that the Missouri statute provided an equal playing
field between out-of-state and in-state products or producers.121
According to the court, both were required to use the same three-tier
system with the same three year-residential restrictions.122 The Eighth
Circuit also explained that the true purpose of the statute was to “promote
responsible consumption, combat illegal underage drinking, and achieve
other important state policy goals. . . .”123 Importantly, the court
determined that the statute was not enacted for economic protectionism.124
Relying on North Dakota, the Eighth Circuit noted that state policies that
define the structure of the liquor system are “unquestionably
legitimate.”125 Under this framework, the court concluded that Section 2
protects the three-tier system and therefore insulates licensing
requirements placed on wholesalers within a three-tier system.126 Because
the three-year resident requirement passed the Granholm test, the Eighth
Circuit determined that the wholesaler residency restriction survived
Dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny.127 The Second Circuit provided
support for the Eighth Circuit’s Southern Wine approach when it reached
a similar conclusion in Arnold’s Wines v. Boyle.128
The Fifth Circuit flipped the focus from wholesaler licensing
regulations to the licensing of retailers in Cooper v. Texas Alcoholic
118

Id. at 802 (citing MO. REV. STAT. §§ 311.180(1), 311.200).
Id. at 803.
120
Id. at 809. The North Dakota test said that Section 2 directly supports the
three-tier system that is “unquestionably legitimate” Cooper v. McBeath, 11 F.3d 547,
549 (5th Cir. 1994).
121
Id. at 810.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 808–09.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 809 (citing North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 447 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring)).
126
Id. at 810.
127
Id. at 812.
128
Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 571 F.3d 185, 189–91 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding
that a New York statutory scheme that allowed for in-state retailers to obtain offpremises delivery licenses, but not out-of-state retailers constitutional under Section 2
and not subject to Dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny).
119
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Beverage Commission.129 In Cooper, the Fifth Circuit discussed the
tensions between Section 2 and the Dormant Commerce Clause when it
examined a Texas statute requiring a one-year durational residency
requirement for alcohol retailers and retailer officials.130 The Fifth Circuit
declined to follow the Eighth Circuit’s approach in Southern Wine
regarding wholesaler residency licensing requirements. 131 The Fifth
Circuit reasoned that, unlike at the producer tier, state regulations imposed
upon the retailer and wholesaler tiers are not immune from Dormant
Commerce Clause scrutiny simply because they do not favor in-state
producers or products.132 According to the Cooper court, Section 2
insulates a physical-residency requirement on retailers and wholesalers
from Dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny, even though such provision
favors in-state businesses, as it is vital to the three-tier system.133 The court
argued that Section 2 does not, however, authorize a durational-residency
requirement because such requirements favor in-state wholesalers and
retailers but are not an “inherent” aspect of the three-tier system.134
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit held that the durational-residency statute was
subject to Dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny and unconstitutional.135
The Seventh Circuit endorsed the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the
Granholm and North Dakota tests when it reached a similar conclusion in
Lebamoff Enterprises, Inc. v. Rauner.136
As two interpretations of the Granholm and North Dakota tests
emerged throughout the various circuits, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Association v. Thomas to
resolve the circuit split.137 This case involved a Tennessee statute
requiring two years of “bona fide” durational residency to apply for a retail
liquor license.138 In 2012, Tennessee’s Attorney General stopped the

See Cooper v. Tex. Alcoholic Bev. Comm’n, 820 F.3d 730 (5th Cir. 2016)
(emphasis added).
130
Id. at 734.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id. (“Distinctions between in-state and out-of-state retailers and wholesalers
are permissible only if they are an inherent aspect of the three-tier system.”).
136
Lebamoff Enterp. Inc. v. Rauner, 909 F.3d 847, 849–50 (7th Cir. 2018)
(holding that an Illinois statutory scheme that required retailers to obtain physical instate presence to ship directly to consumers via mail order, but not out-of-state retailers
is unconstitutional under the Dormant Commerce Clause and is not protected under
Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment).
137
Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2459
(2019).
138
TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-3-204(b)(2)(A) (2015); Tenn. Wine & Spirits
Retailers Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. at 2457 (emphasis added).
129
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enforcement of the durational residential requirement on grounds that it
violated the Dormant Commerce Clause under the previous holdings in
the Fifth and Seventh Circuits.139 In retaliation, the Tennessee General
Assembly amended the relevant statute with a legislative purpose and
intent statement to protect the statute from apparent Dormant Commerce
Clause scrutiny.140 The amendment cited health, safety, welfare, control,
and accountability of retail liquor stores as its rationale for the two-year
durational residency requirements for retailers.141
The Supreme Court ultimately held that the two-year durational
residency requirement lacked Section 2 protection and was unconstitutional
under the Dormant Commerce Clause.142 The test applied in Tennessee Wine
provides that any state law that discriminates against out-of-state goods or
nonresident economic actors may be sustained only on a showing that it is
narrowly tailored to advance a legitimate local purpose and that there are no
nondiscriminatory means available.143 The Court determined that the
Tennessee statute at issue was protectionist in nature and that there was little
relationship between the durational licensing requirements and the
advancement of public health or safety interests.144 Tennessee Wine
ultimately confirmed the Fifth Circuit’s argument in Cooper that a durationalresidency requirement for retailers or wholesalers is not an “essential feature”
of a three-tier scheme.145 After Tennessee Wine, it appeared that the Supreme
Court had effectively corked the tensions between Section 2 and the Dormant
Commerce Clause for good.
Shortly thereafter, the Sixth Circuit was the first to interpret the new
Tennessee Wine standard.146 In Lebamoff Enterprises v. Whitmer, a
Michigan statute allowed in-state liquor retailers to deliver directly to an
in-state consumer.147 Therefore, the court faced a narrow question: if a
state has a three-tier system that requires all alcohol sales to run through
its in-state wholesalers,148 and if it requires retailers to be located within
139

Specifically, the holdings found in S. Wine & Spirits of Am., Inc. v. Div. of
Alcohol and Tobacco Control, 731 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 2013) and Arnold’s Wines, Inc.
v. Boyle, 571 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2009); Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n, 139 S.
Ct. at 2457–58.
140
Specifically, the holdings found in Lebamoff, 909 F.3d at 847 and Cooper v.
Tex. Alcoholic Bev. Comm’n, 820 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 2016); TENN. CODE ANN. § 573-204(b)(4) (2015); Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. at 2458.
141
TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-3-204(b)(4) (2015); Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers
Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. at 2458.
142
Lebamoff, 956 F.3d at 869 (quoting Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n,
139 S. Ct. at 2461).
143
Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. at 2474–75.
144
Id.
145
Id. at 2471.
146
See Lebamoff, 956 F.3d at 863.
147
Id. at 868.
148
See Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. at 2457.
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the state,149 may it restrict the delivery options of out-of-state retailers via
statute while allowing for delivery of alcohol by in-state retailers?150
Under Tennessee Wine, the answer – according to the Sixth Circuit – was
yes.151 The court noted that an in-state retailer is subject to the rules and
regulations of Michigan’s three-tier system, whereas an out-of-state
retailer is not bound by the same safety standards.152 The Sixth Circuit
held that the Michigan statute did not violate the Dormant Commerce
Clause because Section 2 granted states express authority over the
importation of alcohol within their borders.153 The Court also asserted that
the law promoted legitimate state interests and the law’s limiting factors
did not flow from economic protectionism.154

IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Sarasota, Judge Loken wrote the opinion for a unanimous panel in
the Eighth Circuit.155 The Eighth Circuit held that the Missouri laws at
issue are essential to a three-tier system and that the rules governing the
license of direct shipments of wine to Missouri consumers apply
evenhandedly to all who qualify for an in-state retailer’s license.156
The court’s analysis follows Tennessee Wine, expanding the
coverage of the Dormant Commerce Clause over the implementation of a
state’s three-tier system that is otherwise “unquestionably legitimate.”157
To effectively defeat Dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny, the principles
underlying a Section 2 argument must be sufficiently implicated—
specifically, the state must show a valid interest in regulating alcohol.158
The Eighth Circuit laid out several successfully-claimed state interests that
previously survived Dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny and received
Section 2 protection, such as: (1) promoting responsible consumption, (2)

Cooper v. Tex. Alcoholic Bev. Comm’n, 820 F.3d 730, 734 (5th Cir. 2016).
Lebamoff, 956 F.3d at 870.
151
Id.
152
Id. at 872–73.
153
Id. at 873 (citing Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. at 2471).
154
Lebamoff, 956 F.3d at 871.
155
Sarasota Wine Mkt., LLC v. Schmitt, 987 F.3d 1171, 1175 (8th Cir. 2021).
156
By Missouri imposing the same licensing requirements on in-state and outof-state retailers selling to Missouri Consumers, every use of Section 2 could be
defined as “discriminatory because every statute limiting importation leaves intrastate
commerce unaffected. If that were the sort of discrimination that lies outside state
power, Section 2 would be facially irrelevant.” Sarasota, 987 F.3d at 1184.
157
Sarasota, 987 F.3d at 1180 (citing Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n, 139
S. Ct. at 2471; Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 488–90 (2005); North Dakota v.
United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263,
275 (1984)).
158
Sarasota, 987 F.3d at 1180.
149
150
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preventing underage drinking, and (3) collecting sales and excise taxes to
benefit the state’s alcohol-based education and treatment programs.159
However, the court also acknowledged that those claims would fail when
combined with a theory of economic protectionism unless there was no
other non-discriminatory alternative to achieve the alleged purpose.160
The Eighth Circuit then illustrated Granholm, Southern Wine, and
Tennessee Wine as binding precedents.161 The court, however, first needed
to rectify and reexamine its prior precedent in Southern Wine. The Eighth
Circuit argued that the Supreme Court overruled only part of the Southern
Wine reasoning when it held in Tennessee Wine that the Dormant
Commerce Clause applied to all three-tiers of the three-tier system.162 The
Eighth Circuit further explained that Missouri’s three-year wholesaler
residency requirement passes muster because it serves valid health, safety,
and regulatory interests.163 The court clarified that although the Supreme
Court invalidated Tennessee’s two-year durational residency requirement,
its holding was limited to those seeking an initial retail license, as opposed
to wholesalers who are the true backbone of the three-tier system.164 The
Eighth Circuit also noted that the residency requirement in Tennessee
Wine was protectionist by nature and had no adequate state interests to
survive Dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny.165
The Eighth Circuit then cited many cases to explain that the retail
licensing requirements at issue here were consistently upheld as essential
to a three-tier system that is “unquestionably legitimate.”166 The court
specifically applied the reasoning in Cooper v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage
Commission to support its proposition, stating that “distinctions between
in-state and out-of-state retailers and wholesalers are permissible if they
are an inherent aspect of the three-tier system.”167 Cooper, however,
outright declined to follow the Eighth Circuit’s prior holding in Southern
Wine, leading to a complete change in the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning and

159

Id.
Id. (citing Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. at 2469).
161
Id. at 1180–81.
162
Id. at 1181.
163
Id.
164
Id. at 1181–82 (emphasis added).
165
Id.
166
Id. at 1182 (citing Byrd v. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n , 883 F.3d
608, 623 (6th Cir. 2018); Cooper v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 820 F.3d 730,
743 (5th Cir. 2016); Tex. Package Stores Ass’n v. Fine Wine & Spirits of N. Tex., 137
S. Ct. 494 (2016); Wine Country Gift Baskets.com v. Steen, 612 F.3d 809, 818–20
(5th Cir. 2010); Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 571 F.3d 185, 191; Brooks v. Vassar,
462 F.3d 341, 352 (4th Cir. 2006)).
167
Sarasota, 987 F.3d at 1182.
160
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precedent for the present issue.168 The Eighth Circuit then, unexpectedly,
relied on the Sixth Circuit’s recent holding in Lebamoff Enterprises v.
Whitmer, which, in turn, relied on Southern Wine—the Eighth Circuit case
that was overturned by the Supreme Court in Tennessee Wine.169 The court
agreed with the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Lebamoff that opening Missouri
to direct deliveries from out-of-state retailers undermined the protective
path of alcohol distribution expressly afforded by a three-tier system
within a state.170
Therefore, the wholesale durational residency
requirements in Sarasota were distinguished from the retail durational
residency requirements in Tennessee Wine because wholesaler regulations
are an inherently necessary part of the three-tier system.171

V. COMMENT
When some people hear of an impending blizzard or hurricane, they
form excessive lines at the gas station, clear grocery store shelves where
bread, milk, and eggs once stood, and buy out generators at hardware
stores across the nation.172 There is one location that a few revelers will
journey to in case of an emergency: the liquor store.173 This stock-upbefore-the-lockdown mentality only multiplied throughout the Covid-19
pandemic.174 In fact, when the world went into lockdown, consumers
See Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 820 F.3d at 743 (“We [ ] expressly
decline to follow Southern Wine and instead adhere to the reading of Heald adopted
in Wine Country Gift Baskets.com v. Steen, 612 F.3d 809, 821 (5th Cir. 2010).”).
169
Sarasota, 987 F.3d at 1182–83. Southern Wine was expressly overturned in
Tennessee Wine. Id. at 1181.
170
Id. at 1183 (citing Lebamoff Enters. v. Whitmer, 956 F.3d 863, 872–73 (6th
Cir. 2020)).
171
Id.
172
Milk, bread, and eggs have been dubbed the Trinity of Winter-Storm Panic
Shopping by THE ATLANTIC, even though they have an extremely short shelf life. Joe
Pinsker, Milk, Bread, and Eggs: The Trinity of Winter-Storm Panic -Shopping, THE
ATLANTIC (Jan. 22, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/01/
buy-same-foods-snowstorm/425664/ [https://perma.cc/9WTL-5TUD].
173
Hurricane parties have dated back to 1969, with powerful storms striking the
Florida Panhandle. Walmart also sees a dramatic increase in alcohol sales pending
any type of natural disaster or storm. Christie Armario, For Some in Florida,
Hurricane Season is Time to Party, INSURANCE JOURNAL (May 14, 2009),
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2009/05/14/100493.htm
[https://perma.cc/S58B-VDND]; Aditi Shrikant, The psychology behind the prehurricane run to the grocery store, VOX (Oct. 10, 2018, 12:13 PM),
https://www.vox.com/the-goods/2018/9/12/17851440/hurricane-michael-shoppingpreparedness [https://perma.cc/A9TE-FL2S].
174
Elva Ramirez, U.S. On Track To Be Biggest Alcohol E-Commerce Market by
2021, FORBES (Nov. 30, 2020, 2:54 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/elvaramirez/
2020/11/30/us-on-track-to-be-biggest-alcohol-e-commerce-market-by-2024/?sh=
6e7f3b182986 [https://perma.cc/N9HR-NCKU].
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enjoyed ordering their booze direct-to-their-door more than ever.175 The
United States e-commerce market for liquor and wine tripled in 2020,
reaching an eighty percent increase, while general e-commerce grew only
nineteen percent.176 This dramatic upsurge demonstrates America’s
newfound thirst for alcohol delivered directly to their door.
Following the Supreme Court’s opinion in Granholm, online alcohol
sales have rarely entered the judicial dialogue about the intersection
between Section 2 and the Dormant Commerce Clause.177 In Lebamoff
Enterprises v. Huskey, Judge Hamilton, in his concurrence, opened the
conversation surrounding the regulation and distribution of alcohol in the
modern e-commerce era by stating: “the three-tier distribution system [is]
a model that may seem to have less and less value as the internet and ecommerce flatten the global marketplace.”178 Under the modern
Tennessee Wine test, it is clear that the three-tier model, once endorsed by
the Supreme Court as “unquestionably legitimate” and given Section 2
protection, now violates the Dormant Commerce Clause.
The Tennessee Wine test maintains that any state law discriminating
against out-of-state goods or nonresident economic actors can be sustained
only on a showing that it is narrowly tailored to advance a legitimate local
purpose and that there is no evidence of a nondiscriminatory alternative
available.179 As explained below, the Missouri statutes limiting direct-toconsumer transactions to licensed, in-state retailers are not narrowly
tailored to serve a legitimate local purpose that could not otherwise be
served with nondiscriminatory alternatives.
First, some argue that a three-tier system and ban on interstate directto-consumer sales is necessary to prevent sales to minors.180 Although
preventing illegal sales to minors is unquestionably a legitimate state
interest, a state can accomplish this goal in a narrower, less discriminatory
manner. A state that permits in-state retailers to ship alcohol directly to
consumers but prohibits out-of-state retailers from doing the same cannot

175
Chris Furnari, Online Alcohol Sales Surge Amid Coronavirus Pandemic,
FORBES (Dec. 1, 2020, 5:23 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chrisfurnari/2020/
12/01/online-alcohol-sales-surge-amid-coronavirus-pandemic/?sh=1144144e4f3a
[https://perma.cc/9ESU-FE2J].
176
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billion, IWSR DRINKS MARKET ANALYSIS (2020), https://www.theiwsr.com/
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[https://perma.cc/NQA9-C4QU].
177
See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 490 (2005) (referring to the internet
as a way for minors to access alcohol illegally).
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Lebamoff Enters. v. Huskey, 666 F.3d 455, 472 (7th Cir. 2012) (Hamilton,
J., concurring).
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(2019).
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Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2022

21

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 3 [2022], Art. 18

974

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

plausibly argue that its approach is tailored at all – let alone narrowly – to
prevent sales to minors.181 There is no evidence that out-of-state retailers
are more likely to or have a higher capability to ship alcohol directly to
minors. For example, one way a state may address sales to minors is to
require common carriers to check appropriate government-issued
identification at the time of delivery for age verification.182 And most state
statutory schemes already require that the common carriers delivering the
alcohol to the consumer be licensed by their respective states to check for
proper and legal consumer identification.183 Therefore, there is no reason
why out-of-state retailers should be treated any differently than in-state
retailers for the purposes of preventing sales to minors.
Second, some argue that a three-tier system and ban on interstate
direct-to-consumer sales is necessary to prevent excessive alcohol
consumption within a given community.184 A state undoubtedly has a
legitimate interest in preventing alcoholism and monitoring alcohol sales,
but again, states can accomplish this goal in a narrower, less
discriminatory manner. A consumer is not likely to differentiate between
in-state and out-of-state retailers when making alcohol purchases online;
and if a legal adult wants to purchase alcohol, they will find a way,
regardless of who is selling the product.185
Proponents of a three-tier system often argue that the taxation
imposed at each level of the three-tier system raises the price of the
alcohol, which in turn leads to decreased consumption. 186 This assertion
is inaccurate.187 Online prices are often compared to brick-and-mortar
inventory and priced competitively, including heavy shipping mark-ups or
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subscription-based service fees.188 There is no evidence that consumers
will feel inclined to purchase more alcohol online than they would in
person when the prices are similar. Therefore, on its face, this approach is
neither tailored nor narrowed to limit excessive alcohol consumption.
Those in favor of the three-tier system also cite its ability to create a paper
trail of taxation at each level to determine where alcohol is distributed and
consumed.189 Within the past decade, however, companies like Drizzy,
Amazon, DoorDash, and Uber have built such large data infrastructure
systems that shipments and sales are all easily accounted for and tracked
like never before.190 Thus, a ban on interstate direct-to-consumer shipment
is not necessary to accomplish the legitimate state interest of monitoring
alcohol sales within a community.
Third, a three-tier system’s ban on interstate direct-to-consumer sales
is a greater danger to public health than the nondiscriminatory alternative
of a less restrictive system built around e-commerce.191 Throughout most
of 2020, every State and Territory, along with the District of Columbia,
was under a state of emergency because of the Covid-19 pandemic.192 The
state of emergency orders called for people to shelter-in-place, thus
restricting brick-and-mortar visits and human-sales interactions.193 From
the perspective of modern-day consumers, there is a significant public
health and safety appeal to buying wine online and receiving it at their
door instead of subjecting themselves to imminent exposure to a novel
virus. In addition, the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic has led to favoring
a direct-to-consumer market because it promotes a legitimate state interest
in public health by better allocating resources, minimizing exposure for
consumers, and promoting efficiency within the economy.194 Covid-19
188
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demonstrated the strength of the American economy’s safe and effective
e-commerce system, leading to more expansive and accessible options for
purchasing outside of brick-and-mortar locations.
And finally, a three-tier system and ban on interstate, direct-toconsumer sales unreasonably limits consumer variety when compared to
nondiscriminatory alternatives. For example, consumers in Missouri can
currently purchase wine direct-to-consumer from wineries across the
country under the holding of Granholm.195 Imported wine, however,
cannot be directly shipped from a producer or retailer located outside of
Missouri.196 Therefore, Missouri consumers are limited to the wine
inventory held by in-state licensed retailers and domestic producers under
the current statutory scheme and judicial interpretation.197 As a result, if a
Missouri consumer were to go online looking to buy wine for a special
event, their options would be extremely limited, leading to disappointment
and frustration when living in a global, mobile, and online-based
economy.198
Under the new Tennessee Wine test, the three-tier model endorsed by
the Supreme Court violates the Dormant Commerce Clause. As explained
above, the Missouri statutes supporting the three-tier system’s traditional,
direct-to-consumer restrictions on out-of-state retailers are not narrowly
tailored to serve a legitimate local purpose that could not be otherwise
served with nondiscriminatory alternatives. Therefore, the courts need to
reconsider and review Sarasota because a three-tier system is inherently
unconstitutional within the modern intersection of Section 2 of the
Twenty-First Amendment and the Dormant Commerce Clause.

VI. CONCLUSION
Sarasota represents a new type of prohibition within Missouri in a
modern economy driven by e-commerce. This decision followed the
precedent established by the Supreme Court in Granholm, Southern Wine,
and Tennessee Wine and balanced the Dormant Commerce Clause and the
Twenty-First Amendment. The implications of the new Tennessee Wine
test will continue to play out for years to come in judicial challenges and
will almost certainly transform the interpretation of the Dormant
Commerce Clause and Twenty-First Amendment as we know it.
Unfortunately, by denying Sarasota’s writ for certiorari in 2021,199 the
Supreme Court missed a fantastic opportunity to update Missouri’s Liquor
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Control Act and disband the traditional three-tier system. As the world
becomes more digitalized and e-commerce-based, the Court will have no
choice but to find that the current approach to state liquor laws is
unconstitutional and not protected by the Twenty-First Amendment.
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